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HOW DO FIXED-EXCHANGE-RATES REGIMES WORK: 
THE EVIDENCE FROM THE GOLD STANDARD, BRETTON WOODS AND THE EMS 
ABSTRACT 
This paper defines two competing hypotheses on the working of fixed 
exchange rates.  The "symmetry"  hypothesis states that every country is 
concerned with the good functioning of the system, and cannot afford to 
deviate from world averages.  Every country is just left to follow the 
rules of the game," that is to avoid sterilizing balance of payments 
flows.  The world price level is pegged down either by an external 
numeraire like gold, or by cooperation among central banks, in a fiat 
currency system.  The competing hypothesis states that fixed-exchange- 
rates regimes are inherently asymmetric: they are characterized by a 
'center country" which provides the nominal anchor for the others, 
either by managing the gold parity in a centralized fashion, or by 
arbitrarily setting some other nominal anchor.  I discuss the empirical 
evidence to discriminate between the two hypotheses, by studying the 
institutional features and the data on three experiences of fixed rates: 
the International Gold Standard, the Bretton Woods regime, and the 
European Monetary System. 
Alberto Giovannini 
622 Uris Hall 
Graduate School of Business 
Columbia University 
New York, NY  10027 1.  Introduction 
Few countries freely float their currencies: the International 
Financial Statistics Supplement on Exchange Rates (1985) lists only 12 
out of 147 members of the IMF as "independently floating".  While this 
list includes large countries like the United States, Japan and the 
United Kingdom, as many as 34 countries, for example, peg their 
currencies to the US dollar.  Even so,  in the current open-economy 
macroeconomics  literature most theoretical and empirical papers deal 
with aspects of flexible-exchange-rates regimes. 
There exist two competing hypotheses on the working of fixed 
exchange rates.  The  'symmetry"  hypothesis states that every country is 
concerned with  the good functioning of the system, and cannot afford to 
deviate from world averages.  Every country is just left to follow the 
"rules of the game," that is to avoid sterilizing balance of payments 
flows.  This hypothesis is masterfully described by McCloskey and Zecher 
[1976]. 
If every country is just concerned with accomodating reserve flows 
in order to maintain  its exchange-rate parities, however, the 
international monetary system as a whole suffers from an indeterminacy: 
there is no system-wide nominal anchor.  According to the proponents of 
the symmetry hypothesis, this nominal anchor is provided by an external 
numeraire  like gold, or is agreed upon by member countries through a 
process of international cooperation.  Hence Helpman's  [1981] labeling 
of this regime as a "cooperative peg". 
The competing hypothesis states that fixed-exchange-rates regimes 4 
Under the Lrerton Wooos system, the IMF Articles of Agreement3 
stipulated that each member country declare its par value in terms of 
god4  The dollar grice of gold was 35$ an ounce, and it was never 
changed, untis  the Sn'ichzcnien conference of December 197:.  The  main 
cifference  between  ch gold standard and  the Bretton  Woods  system is 
man in the fcruer  regioe uonenry authortties -at least in those  -  ,-  5  countries on  e  toLl go.5 stuncarc hri;u, Cernany  and the  uS)  --were 
rc-qutred by law to eacharse  dares tic bankrot?s  with gold  coins  at the 
mar -nluu  plos  or sinus tranact:uns cosn).  uhereas after World War C 
cenrnl nanc  used gold  in tmnnsctions mnmng  thenseires  and Irrerrtned 
In the pri.rate bullion aerket at oneir own diocreton,  Since the 
private  sacror had no  rtghts  of offitiel conversior  of national 
a 
currenoier into  gold,  gold ass much  less 'If a direct constraint  on 
tcns  arnetsry policies than in the goio standard era] 
See  7ev  ¶197  for en aneifsfs  of the IMP An; utes o :grereene. 
Cmnntriuc  rm'sld also declare their emci,onge ra: "in tetrs of the Li 
zLller of thu weight and  ihnerzess  in effe' t on Jul' I,  )9L' ,"  ohet  the gold parity could he defined  in terms  of the US  ool]at.  Loan 
wCh rhC mechud,  however,  the ulnirsare nux'teraire  is grIt. 
in  rtencr the conworsior A banknotes into coins  was at the  aurhor!ter' discretion, 
Tew  [l97T'  page 120. 
The ccntreI-'o opratcd through the inCuence  on speculators' 
confidence  :eniee,d ": dev1r'tions between the official and free- 
narkot prine ef gold S 
With  gold as an external numeraire, the gold standard and the 
Bretton Woods system provide, in different degrees, an official nominal 
anchor for all member countries.  In the EMS, by contrast, this official 
nominal anchor is altogether absent.  Each EMS currency, and each 
currency in the European Community, has a central rate determined in 
terms of the European Currency Unit  (ECU),  a basket unit of account that 
comprises a specified quantity of every currency in the  European 
Community.  The ratio of any two ECU central rates is used to obtain 
bilateral central rates, which are  the target rates for monetary 
authorities.  Given that the ECU is just a weighted  average of the 
member countries' currencies, if n  is the number of currencies in the 
ECU, there are only n-i bilateral exchange rates to be pegged: for this 
reason a nominal anchor is absent from the rules governing the EMS.3 
2.2  Bands 
In the gold standard regime, individual currencies' gold parities, 
and the costs of shipping gold internationally, jointly implied 
bilateral bands within  which exchange rates could fluctuate without 
requiring any action by monetary authorities.  Whenever bilateral 
8 
Since some currencies like the pound and the drachma are not part of 
the EMS exchange-rate arrangements, the missing external numeraire is 
in practice provided by these currencies. 8 
2.3  Adlustment and Financing 
During the gold standard central banks were compelled to take 
corrective actions by a  combination of two mechanisms:  the 
convertibility of banknotes  into gold coins,  which encouraged arbitrage 
by the private sector whenever exchange rates exceeded bilateral 
fluctuation limits, and the coverage of banknotes by gold,  which forced 
central banks to maintain a  certain ratio of gold reserves to 
circulating banknotes, thus reacting to fluctuations of their gold 
reserve.12  Changes in the discount rate and open market operations 
(Bloomfield [1959])  were the standard corrective actions.  Various 
central banks also resorted to the so called "manipulation of gold 
points" which I discuss below in section 3. 
No central-bank financing arrangement was part of the institutional 
setup of the gold standard.  However, a number of instances are recorded 
when central banks granted bilateral credit to each other.  Ford  [1962] 
notes that the Bank of France discounted Sterling bills to ease the 
12 Few countries specified a constant ratio of circulation to reserves. 
As Eichengreen [1985]  notes, England, among others, was on a 
fiduciary system, requiring full backing of note issue after a 
certain limit (the fiduciary issue) was reached.  In Germany the Bank 
Act required that note circulation could not exceed a limit above 
three times the value of gold reserves, and if it did,  the Reichsbank 
had to pay a 5 percent tax on the excess circulation.  See US 
National Monetary Commission [1911). 9 
strain on London in  the Autumn of 1906, 1907,  1909,  1910.  Kindleberger 
[1984]  describes the cooperation between European central banks in the 
crisis of 1890,  when the Bank of England asked the Russian State Bank 
not to draw on its deposits in London, obtained from the State 3ank a 
800,000 sterling gold loan,  and from the Bank of France a loan of 
3,000,000 sterling in gold.13 
The Bretton Woods system and the EMS,  by contrast, are 
characterized by a complex structure of loans available to finance 
balance-of-payments needs.  These financial resources support the 
foreign exchange market intervention required to keep currencies within 
their fluctuation bands.  Neither the IMF Articles of Agreement, nor the 
rules governing the EMS,  spell Out the actions that central banks have 
to take when  exchange rates reach bilateral fluctuation margins.  In 
both systems the modality of adjustment to external disequilibria is 
only specified through the rules governing the financing of central 
banks' external imbalances, though there are some concessions to the 
principle of symmetry (in the Bretton Woods regime through the clauses 
on 'scarce' currencies, see Argy  [1981],  in the EMS with  the divergence 
indicator, and the Very Short Financing Facility, described below). 
Under the Bretton Woods regime member countries could draw on 
various tranches of their IMF "quota".  These tranches are characterized 
by different degrees of "conditionality", that imposes progressively 
13 
See also Bloomfield  [1959].. 10 
tighter constraints on  monetary and fiscal policies: resources are made 
available to the borrowers subject to their  meeting certain prespecified 
14 
performance criteria. 
The EMS rules  for balance-of-payments financing appear to be 
designed to avoid crises: the central banks of the  currencies reaching 
bilateral intervention margins are supposed to grant each other 
automatic credit (not subject to authorization) in unlimited amounts 
under the Very Short Term Financing Facility.15  The Very Short Term 
Financing Facility can also be used to support foreign exchange market 
intervention within the marginal fluctuation  bands, subject to the 
authorization of the central bank whose currency is being drawn.  The 
Short Term  Monetary  Support, another form a financial assistance 
available to EMS central banks experiencing temporary balance-of- 
payments difficulties,  is instead governed by a "quota" system similar 
to that used by the IMF. 
14 
In the 1960s even the lowest conditionality resources, however, were 
not obtainable quickly enough to be usable to fend-off balance-of- 
payments crises. 
15  .  .  .  . 
See  Alesina  and  Grilli  [1987]  for an illustration of the 
effectiveness of these arrangements in avoiding speculative attacks. 
Credit lines for marginal intervention mature 75 days after the end 
of the month following the one in which the intervention has taken 
place. 11 
2.4  Is Asymmetry Induced by the Institutions? 
The very brief survey of institutional features of the three fixed- 
exchange-rates regimes suggests two observations.  First, the basic 
structure of internationa] monetary systems has not changed dramatically 
in the last century.  In particular, despite the efforts of policymakers 
to improve upon the IMF Articles of Agreement, the features of the 
Bretton Woods system and the EMS are noticeably similar.  Both systems 
are characterized by essentially a lack of an external  nominal anchor 
(given the minor role played by gold during the Bretton Woods regime), 
and by elaborate structures of balance of payments financing 
arrangements, which stand in contrast to the absence of any explicit 
rules for central banks to follow when  bilateral fluctuations margins 
are reached.  The added complications of the EMS, regarding the 
divergence indicator, have proved impractical.16  In the gold standard, 
instead, adjustment rules were provided by the market mechanism, and by 
each country's coverage system. 
The second observation suggested by my survey is that the rules of 
the gold standard, Bretton Woods and the EMS do not seem per se to 
induce an asymmetric working of international adjustment.  Except in the 
case of Bretton Woods-  -where the bilateral fluctuation bands of the 
dollar are narrower than those of the other currencies-  -none of the 
basic institutional features of the three fixed-exchange-rate regimes 
16 See Giavazzi and Giovannini  [forthcomingl for a discussion. 14 
devices were used by the Bank of France and the Reichsbank (Bloomfield 
[1959J), 
The use of regulatory controls as emergency measures is common also 
in the Bretton Woods and EMS years.  Article VI of the IMF Articles of 
Agreement even allows the Fund to request countries with balance of 
payments problems to impose capital controls for a limited time, in 
order to prevent the use of Fund resources.  In response to capital 
account deficits, the Kennedy Administration proposed an investment tax 
credit in 1961,  and passed the Interest Equalization Tax in 1963--a tax 
on  US residents' purchases of foreign securities--followed by the 
Foreign Credit Restraint Program and the Foreign Direct Investment 
Program--aimed at limiting foreign investments by commercial banks, 
other financial institutions, and industrial companies.  French and 
Italian authorities tightened various measures to prevent capital 
outflows after the Summer of 1968 and the Fall of 1969. 
The practice of using capital controls as a fine-tuEiig device to 
stem speculative flows has survived im the EMS.  Countries like France 
and Italy, which until recently have prohibited the non-firm private 
sector to trade on financial assets with the rest of the world, have 
used  restrictions on international trade credits to slow down or speed 
up the response of short term capital flows.19 
19 
In Giavazzi and Giovannini  forthcoming] we show that the tightening 
and release of controls on international trade credits by France and 
Italy can be explained by the occurence of balance of payments 
difficulties, and is used very frequently by central banks.  We also 15 
Giavazzi and Giovannini [1986]  argue that in the EMS countries like 
France and Italy crucially rely on capital controls, witness the large 
divergences between domestic and offshore interest rates on franc and 
lira assets.  They see asyuunetries  of capital controls as just a 
reflection of the  central role played by the Bundesbank, and capital 
controls as instrumental for countries other than Germany to maintain 
their exchange rate targets in the EMS, without having to surrender 
completely their monetary sovereignty.  This observation raises two 
related questions.  Are all fixed-exchange-rates regimes characterized 
by asymmetries in the degree to which capital controls are used?  Is the 
presence of these asymmetries an indication of the existence of a 
central country? 
A  broad overview of the usage of capital controls suggests a 
positive  answer to the first question.  There is ample qualitative 
evidence and opinion (see,  for example, Bloomfield [1959],  Ford  (1962], 
Scanimell  [1965])  that the Bank of England tended to use administrative 
devices less frequently than its counterparts in the continent.  It is 
well known that the  convertibility of banknotes into gold was not 
guaranteed by law in France, but was left to the central bank's 
discretion.  The much less frequent changes of the discount rate by the 
Bank of France, relative to the Bank of England and the Reichsbank, 
tends to imply the effectiveness of the threat of inconvertibility, 
model the effects of controls on trade credits on the differentials 
between onshore and offshore rates. 16 
which  was accompanied by numerous changes of the gold points.  In 
Germany international shipments of gold were apparently discouraged by 
moral suasion.  As Bloomfield [1959]  reported, Reichsbsnk officials 
questioned at the United States National Monetary Commission denied that 
the central bank discouraged commercial banks to obtain gold for export 
when the gold export point was reached, but admitted that at certain 
times German banks refrained from shipping gold when it was profitable 
to do so.  This phenomenon is independently confirmed by Birch [1887] 
in his presidential address to the London Institute of Bankers: 
"I was raising the question, only a  few days since, with some of 
the leading bankers in Berlin, whether the Bank of Germany would 
give large amounts of gold in exchange for its notes, and rhey 
explained to me that,  if gold was required to use as currency, they 
had no difficulty in getting what they wanted, but that they were 
too Patriotic to think of going to the bank for  gold with a view to 
making a profit on the export." (Birch [1887,  p. 510]) 
The evidence nn asymmetric use of capital controls during the 
Bretton Woods years is,  to some extent, less clearcut.  While  in the 
second postwar period as a whole the United States  have regulated 
international capital flows less than their European counterparts, 
episodes like the Interest Equalization Tax were clearly motivated by 
the concern of the external influence on domestic monetary management. 
The imposition of capital controls was not only resorted to by 
deficit countries.  In the months preceding the revaluation of the 
Deutsche mark  of March 1961,  the Bundesbank struggled with capital 
inflows by imposing a series of discriminatory measures meant to 17 
discourage foreign residents' purchases of German assets,2°  These 
measures  included higher reserve requirements on foreign owned deposits 
at German commercial banks, the prohibition to pay interest on foreign— 
owned sight and time deposits, and the prohibition to sell money-market 
paper to nonresidents. 
In summary, both  the evidence on the gold standard and the  EMS 
suggest that countries other than England (during the gold standard) and 
Germany (in the EMS) imposed regulations in order avoid compliance to 
the "rules of the game": in an asymmetric system the rules of the game 
consist in accomodating fully the center-country's monetary policies.21 
Hence these regulations might have been suggesetd by a desire of 
maintaining some degree of monetary sovereignty.  The evidence on the 
Bretton Woods seems to indicate that capital controls were resorted to 
more often outside of the US, although even the US experimented with 
them in a number of cases. 
20 
Yaeger [1966J. 
21 This point is shown explicitly in the next section. 18 
4.  Symmetric and Asymmetric Fixed Exchange Rates Regimes: A Definition 
The alternative hypotheses about the working of fixed exchange 
rates can be illustrated using the canonical model of the gold 
standard.22  This model concentrates on the external influences on 
domestic monetary policy, and on domestic aggregate variables.  It 
relies on the assumption that monetary policy is powerless in affecting 
real variables, so that real and nominal variables are determined 
independently.  This assumption, which is probably not accurate in 
practice, is not essential for the conclusions I will draw here, but is 
quite helpful to sharpen the distinction between the alternative 
hypotheses on the working of the international monetary system. 
There are two countries, a domestic and a foreign country--whose 
variables are identified by an asterisk.  The rate of inflation in each 
country is determined by the rate of money growth and a velocity shock, 
that is independent of monetary factors: 
*  *  *  pm+v  p  m  +v  (1) 
where in is  the rate of growth of money, and p the rate of inflation.  v 
represents the rate of growth of velocity.  The law of one price holds 
z2 
See Dornbusch and Giovannini  11988),  for example.  Here I adopt the 
version of the model used by Barsky et al.  [l988, who analyzed the 
international implications of the creation of the Federal Reserve 
System. 19 
in the goods market.23  Hence the rates of inflation at home and abroad 
are the same in equilibrium.  Real rates of return on domestic and 
foreign securities are equalized except for a variable, x, representing 




p—p  (2) 
*  r—r+x  (3) 
The balance sheets of the two central banks imply: 
*  *  *  m—d-f  in  —d  f  (4) 
In a fiat currency system, d could be interpreted as the change in 
domestic credit relative to the  initial stock of nominal money.  f is 
the outflow of foreign exchange reserves, also measured in terms of the 
initial stock of money.  Under the gold standard, d and f are the rate 
of growth of the fiduciary issue and the outflow of gold,  respectively. 
Since there are only two countries in the model, one country's gold 
23  .  .  See  Calomiris  and  Hubbard  [1987]  for a careful evaluation of the law 
of one price in goods and assets markets during the gold standard. 
24 It can be shown that in this model a variable real exchange rate,  not 
affected by monetary policy, is equivalent to x.  Hence x can be 
intepreted as a general idiosyncratic shock in goods and assets 
markets. 20 
or reserve outflows are the other country's inflows.  Assuming that the 
two countries are of equal size,  we have: 
*  f.-- f  (5) 
Equations (1)  to  (5) imply the following expressions for the world 
rate of inflation, and the flow of international reserves: 
*  * 
p  05[(d  +  d  )  +  (v + v  )]  (6) 
*  *  f  0.5[(d - d  )  +  (v 
- v  )]  (7) 
As equations (6)  and (7) show, the world rate of inflation is a weighted 
average of the domestic and foreign rates of growth of domestic credit 
(adjusted for velocity  shocks), while reserve flows are determined by 
the deviations of the domestic and foreign monetary policies, and money 
demand shocks.  Nominal interest rates are determined by the Fisher 
equation: 
*  *  *  i=r+p,  i r  +p  (8) 
I define the symmetric fixed-exchange-rateange-rate regime as 
follows.  Under a symmetric fixed-exchange-rates regime each central 
bank attempts to control a domestic target and a foreign target, 
represented by the nominal interest rate, and the rate of change of 21 
foreign exchange reserves: the two target variables have the same 
weights and desired values in central banks' objectives.  I borrow the 
assumption that central bankers' objectives can be described by a 
domestic target and a foreign target from Ciovannini  [1986),  Eichengreen 
[1987].,  Giavazzi and Giovannini [forthcoming], and Barsky et al.  [1988). 
The specification of the domestic target in terms of the nominal rate of 
interest is due to Barro  [1988],  and Barsky et al.  [1988].  In a 
symmetric system, the objective (loss) functions are: 
W  (i -  )2 + bf2  (9) 
*  .*  ;2  *2 
W  (i -  i)  + bf  (10) 
In a commodity-based system like the gold standard, the similarity of 
the two objective functions would arise from the common rules on the 
convertibility of banknotes into gold coins, and on the similarity of 
the rules about specie coverage of banknote circulation.  In a fiat 
system like the EMS, the similarity of the two objective functions would 
arise as a result of systematic international consultations among member 
countries, whose objective is to define common guidelines for monetary 
policy. 
When  central banks maximize  (9) and (10) world  interest rates and 
reserve flows are as follows: 
*  -  i  i  - 0.5x  1  1 + 0.5x  (11) 22 
f  (0.5/b)x  (12) 
International disturbances are equally shared by the two countries, and 
international reserve flows are inversely  proportional to the importance 
of the external target in the two countries' objectives. 
By contrast, I define the asymmetric system as follows: the center 
country targets the domestic interest rate,  while the other country 
minimizes the fluctuations of international reserves.  Hence cointries 
objective functions differ: 
W  (j -  j)2  (9') 
*  *2  W—f  (10') 
The reaction functions implied by  (9')  and (10')  are: 
*  * 
d —  2(1 
-  r) 
- d  -  (v+v  )  (13) 
*  * 
d —  d + (v-v  )  (14) 
Equations (13) and (14)  show that the center country accomodates world 
money demand shocks, but--given the real rate of interest and money 
demand-  - it offsets any changes of domestic credit policy in the 
periphery.  The country at the periphery accomodates the center 
country's policy, and offsets differences in money demand shocks, which 
tend to give rise to international reserve flows.  The equilibrium 23 
interest rates and reserve flows are: 
*  -  i—i  1  i+x  (15) 
f  0  (16) 
Equations (15)  and (16) reveal most clearly the fundamental difference 
between symmetric and asymmetric fixed-exchange-rates systemstes 
systems: in an asymmetric system countries at the periphery give up 
control of their domestic target to achieve stability of foreign reserve 
flows.  In equilibrium all international portfolio shifts are fully 
reflected in changes in the interest rates at the periphery, but do not 
change the interest rate in the center country. 
The illustration of the symmetric and asymmetric regimes adopted in 
this section--based on postulated asymmetries in the objectives of 
central bankers--was preferred to an alternative specification, based on 
the hypothesis that the center-country is a "Stackelberg leader".  That 
model relies on the assumption that changes in monetary policies by 
countries other than the leader cannot elicit the leader's reaction.  By 
contrast, the model I use has in my opinion the virtue of being based on 
a symmetric game structure, but is silent on what gives rise to the 
asymmetries in the objective functions.  The asymmetries could be 
generated by four different phenomena, which I briefly review below. 
They include Mundell's  [1968]  "proper division of the burden of 
international adjustment", the presence of a "reserve currency" country, 24 
liquidity constraints affecting differently surplus and deficit 
countries, and the issue of "imported reputation". 
Robert Mundell  [1968J demonstrates that the adjustment to country- 
specific disturbances should be divided in inverse proportion to the 
sizes of the countries involved.  In our problem, the adjustment to 
relative interest-rate shocks is carried out by the small country: the 
interest rate in the large country is unaffected.  This result can be 
illustrated considering a world made up by two equally-sized regions: 
one occupied by a single large country (the "domestic country"), and the 
* 
other by a large nunber of small countries (denoted by an asterisk,  ), 
indexed by j=l  N.25  In this world, the rate of inflation is:26 
-  O.5[ 
(d+(l/N)Ed;) 
+ (v+(l/N)Ev)  ]  (17) 
Each small country's domestic credit policy has a negligible effect on 
its own rate of inflation.  By contrast, the small countries' reserve 
flows are: 
25 
This subdivision of the world economy, suggested to me by David 
Beckus, facilitates the comparison with the symmetric case reported 
above. 
26  .  .  .  .  From goods mareets equslibrium, dL±vd*f.+v*., for all i's, 
Summing this conditions over all i's,  and using ihe condition that 
world  resarve flows are zero,  one can solve for f.  To compute the 
world rate of inflation, substitute the expression for f into (4)  and 
ci). 25 
— d + v  O.5[ (d÷(l/N)Zd)  + (v+(1/N)v.)  (18) 
In equilibrium, deviations of the two target  variables from their 
desired values are inversely related to the relative effectiveness of 
the instrument: hence the small countries end up nearly pegging their 
foreign exchange reserves, while the task of pegging the world interest 
rate is left to the center country: this corresponds to the the 
asymmetric regime postulated above. 
A similar result would obtain if one of the  two countries issues a 
"reserve" currency: this case is discussed by Swoboda  [1978]  and Genberg 
and Swoboda  [1982].  An increase in high-powered money by the reserve- 
currency country has a larger effect on world inflation than the same 
increase from a non-reserve-currency country.  The foreign exchange 
reserves of the other country increase by a multiple of the original 
monetary expansion, equal to the money multiplier of the reserve 
currency.  Hence the non-reserve-currency central bank would be 
relatively ineffective at targeting the rate of interest, and, as above, 
would end up targeting foreign exchange reserves. 
A third reason for the endogenous establishment of an asymmetric 
regime is the presence of constraints on the size of balance-of-payments 
deficits, justified, for example, by liquidity constraints.  With 
identical objective functions, the equilibrium reserve outflow from the 
domestic country is given by equation (12).  If the domestic country 
faces systematically positive realizations of x,  i.e.  it is a "deficit 26 
country", and if the Costs of financing reserve outflows are large, the 
domestic country would find it advantageous to forego interest rate 
stability by accomodating fully the monetary policy of the center 
country. 
Finally, asymmetric exchange rate regimes could arise in the 
"imported credibility" models of Giavazzi and Giovannini [1987] and 
Giavazzi and Pagano [1988].  These authors show that,  when exchange-rate 
targets are fully credible, inflation-prone central banks might find it 
advantageous to accomodate fully to a central bank which has an 
"inflation fighter" reputation.27 
27 As Giavazzi and Giovannini  [forthcoming] stress,  however,  these 
models do not provide a justification as to why the center-country 
would prefer such an arrangement over,  for example, a flexible 
exchange rate regime. 27 
S.  Empirical Evidence 
In this section I discuss the empirical evidence on the hypothesis 
that the three fixed-exchange-rates regimes worked asymmetrically.  I 
first review the evidence on the  timing of discount rate changes during 
the gold standard.  Then I study the behavior of interest rates in 
correspondence of parity realignments, both during the Bretton Woods and 
the EMS.  And finally I derive and test some stochastic implications of 
the model of section 4. 
5.1  The Timing of Discount-Rate Changes During the Gold Standard 
During the gold standard, changes in the bank rate were considered 
the main policy instruments used by central banks to affect their gold 
reserves and international capital flows.  Bloomfield [1959]  and 
Eichengreen 1987 argue that British rate changes immediately followed 
by changes changes in the continent are evidence suggestive of the 
central role of the Bank of England in the  gold standard.  To verify 
this hypothesis, I have looked at the data published by the US National 
Monetary Commission[l9lO],  reporting dates and amounts of discount rate 
changes for Britain, France and Germany in the period from January 1989 
to December 1907. 
First, I have computed the number of occurrences when a change in 
the British discount rate was followed (within 1 week) by a  change in 28 
the discount rate in France or Germany.  During that period, the Bank of 
England changed the discount rate 104 times, increasing it 59 times, and 
decreasing it 45 times.  The Reichsbank followed the increases in the 
British discount rate 11 times, and followed the rate decreases 14 
times.  There are also 14 cases when the Reichsbank discount rate 
changes preceded those of the Bank of England.28  France, by contrast, 
followed changes of the bank rate much less frequently (a reflection of 
the less intensive use of discount rate policy by the Bank of France). 
Only three British rate changes were followed by France within a week (2 
negative and 1 positive), while France's discount rate adjustments were 
also followed by the Bank of England in three occasions (2 negative 
changes 1 positive).  In the case of France, there are also three 
instance of discount rate changes occurring the same day.29 
Table 2 contains statistical tests of the timing of discount rate 
changes, using 992 weekly observations in the period mentioned above.  I 
estimate a vector autoregression including 8 lags of the British, French 
and German rates, and test the joint significance of the coefficients of 
each set of lagged rates in each regression.  The table shows no 
evidence of temporal precedence in the changes in the British bank rate. 
Instead, lagged values of the German discount rate are significantly 
28 
times upwards, 7 downwards. 
29 
January 10 and January 24,  1989. 29 
correlated with  the Bank rate and the French discount rate.°  In 
summary, there is very  little evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
Bank rate changes preceded changes in discount rates in the continent. 
As I argue in Giovannini [1986],  at least in the monthly data,  there is 
a strong contemporaneous correlation between the British and the German 
rate.3'  This correlation, however,  is almost entirely due to the common 
seasonal component in discount rate policies, and therefore cannot be 
interpreted as supporting the hypothesis of the leadership of the Bank 
32 
of England. 
How should we interpret these results?  The temporal pattern of 
discount-rate changes being tested in this section is consistent with a 
leader-follower structure, where the  center country's central bank 
always moves first, independently of the other central banks' actions, 
and taking their reactions into account.  The empirical evidence 
30 
This evidence contrasts with the findings of Eichengreen [1987]  He 
estimated morthly bivariate VARs which included the British discount 
rate and the German and French rate,  respectively.  He found that 
lagged values of the British rate were significantly correlated with 
both  the  French and the German rates.  I was unable to reproduce 
these results, by reconstructing Eichengreen's sample.  While my 
coefficient estimates are virtually identical to his, I found in the 
monthly data that lagged values of the British rate were not 
significantly correlated with the German rate, while lagged values of 
the French rate were significant in the Bank Rate regression. 
31  .  .  .  . 
Since  the French rate changes only few times in this period, I left 
it out of my analysis. 
32 
See Andreades  [1909],  Keynes [1930]  and Ford [1962]  for a description 
of the "autumnal drains" that prompted these reactions by central 
bankers. 30 
presented here rejects this hypothesis.33  This evidence, however, has 
no conclusive implications for the asymmetric model of the gold standard 
34 
in section 4. 
5.2  The Asymmetric Behavior of Interest Rates 
A  rather general implication of the model in section 4 regards the 
behavior of interest rates.  While in a symmetric regime international 
portfolio shifts are reflected in both countries' interest rates, in an 
asymmetric regime the center country's rate is unaffected, and 
international portfolio disturbances perturb only the other countries' 
35 
rates. 
This result suggests a simple test of the asymmetry hypothesis, 
Evidence on the timing structure of discount rates during the EMS is 
provided by Roubini  [1988].  Using quarterly data, he finds that 
lagged values of  the German discount rate are correlated with 
Italian, Belgian and Danish rates, which he inteprets as evidence of 
German leadership.  Genberg Saidi and Swoboda [1982]  test the 
temporal precedence of US monetary policies during the Bretton Woods 
years: their evidence does not consistently support the hypothesis 
that US monetary policy changes preceded those in the rest of the 
world. 
The limited use of Granger causality tests is argued in detail by 
Cooley and Leroy [1985]. 
Giavazzi and Giovannini [1987]  show that the asymmetric behavior of 
interest rates is also an implication of models where prices are 
sticky. 31 
based on the observation of countries' interest rates in correspondence 
of observable international portfolio shifts.  The most natural choice 
of episodes of shifts between countries' assets is the periods preceding 
devaluations.  Both under the Bretton Woods regime and in the EMS there 
have been several realignments of central parities, which have been 
prompted by countries' inability to withstand balance-of-payments 
difficulties, and have been anticipated--though to different degrees--by 
financial markets.  In this section I analyze the behavior of interest 
rates around the Bretton Woods realignments of March 1961 (Deutsche mark 
revalued), November 196] (devaluation of sterling), August 1969 (French 
franc devalued), and October 1969 (Deutsche mark revalued). 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 report monthly observations of the 1-month 
eurodollar deposit rates,  and of the differential between the eurodollar 
rate and a domestic money market rate in the US,  during an interval of 
two years around the realignments of 1961,  1967 and l969 Figures 4, 
5, 6 and 7 report weekly data (taken  on Fridays) on the US Treasury 
Bills rate and the forward premium.  The sources are the Wall Street 
Journal for the US interest rate,  and the Economist for the forwarl 
premium.  The  forward premium is calculated using the bilateral rates of 
sterling: it is the ratio of the 1-month  forward rate (expressed in 
units of the currency for 1 dollar) and the spot exchange rate,  less 1 
(the result is multiplied by 1200 to express the implied interest rate 
36 
These data are obtained from International Financial Statistics. 32 
differential  in percent per annum). 
Figures 1 and 4 illustrate the behavior of dollar interest rates 
and the DM/dollar forward premium in correspondence of the revaluation 
of the mark on March 6, 1961.  Figure 4 shows that the volatility of the 
interest rate differential implied by the forward market much exceeds 
the volatility of the US Treasury bills rate.  On January 13 the foreign 
exchange market implies a negative DM-dollar differential of about I 
percent.  That differential decreases to -6 percent and -2.5 percent  the 
weeks following  the realignment.  These  large fluctuations  of the 
interest rate differential implied by  the forward rate are  accompanied 
by  a much  smaller  increase of the eurodollar rate  (shown in figure  1) 
which reached 4.14 percent in December  1960,  but fell to about  3.5 
percent the February before  the revaluation of the DM, 
Figures  2 and 5 report US rates and forward premia around the 
devaluation of sterling on November 20,  1967.  Figure 2 shows a large 
peak  in the Eurodollar interest rate and the offshore-domestic 
differential for the dollar in the month of November-  - suggesting  that 
the sterling crisis had some repercussion on the dollar (evidence 
against the asymmetry hypothesis).  Figure 5 shows wide swings in the 
forward discount on sterling, especially after the date of the 
devaluation, and a slight increase in the US TEill rate in the weeks 
preceding the devaluation. 
Finally, figures 3,  6 and 7 illustrate the data for the August 11, 
1969 devaluation of the franc, and the October 24 revaluation of the UN. 33 
As figure 3 shows, 1969 is a year of high and volatile Eurodollar 
interest rates.  Figure 6 presents the data for the French devaluation. 
It shows that the forward market implied a very high differential 
between French and US interest rates at the end of June, without any 
large swings in the US Thills rate.  The TBill rate, however, falls from 
7.4 to 6.05 percent in the week preceding the devaluation.  Figure 7 
contrasts the relative stability of the US Thills rate with a sharp 
increase of the dollar-DM interest rate differential implied by the 
forward premium, which reached 13 percent on September 19. 
Figures 8 and 9 report domestic and offshore interest rates for the 
lira, the French franc and the Deutsche mark, in the weeks preceding and 
immediately following the ENS realignment of April 7, 1986, when both 
the lira and the French franc were devalued relative to the Deutsche 
mark.  This episode was first studied by Giavazzi and Giovannini [1987]. 
The large swings of the offshore  interest rates  on the franc and the 
lira  occur despite of a strikingly stable pattern of the domestic and 
offshore DM rates. 
In summary,  the behavior of interest rates in correspondence to 
devaluations strongly suggests the presence of asymmetry in the  two  EMS 
episodes.  The sharp movements of dollar rates in correspondence of the 
sterling devaluation in 1967 are in contrast to the hypothesis that the 
US was  the center country during the Bretton Woods years.  The Bretton 
Woods data,  however, should be interpreted with caution, since this 
analysis cannot identify and control for portfolio shifts that did not 34 
involve dollar assets: the maintained assumption is that the observed 
international interest rate differentials reflect incipient portfolio 
reallocations between dollar assets and the assets denominated in the 
depreciating or appreciating currency. 
5.3  yploring the Stochastic Implications  of the Asymmetric Model of 
dExchane  Rates 
Following the analysis of section 4,  I  assume that central  banks 
minimize  the following  objective functions: 
-  E 1lt+j  lt+ 
+ b(y2+1  (19) 





are the home and external target  variables,  in both 
* 
countries (foreign-country variables denoted by a  )  This  maximization 




+ C(L)Z  (20) 
—  A  (L)Y1 
+ B (L)Yi  +  C (L)Z  (21) 
Where A(L),  B(L) and C(L), and the corresponding starred variables are 35 
polynomials in the lag operator.  Y  and y* are the vectors of targets 
for the domestic and the foreign country, and Z is a vector which 
includes exogenous variables, stochastic disturbances, and the 
instruments available to the two central bankers. 






A  similar condition holds for the foreign central bank. 
Equation  (22)  implies that,  if b  equals zero,  deviations of the 
domestic target variable from its desired value should be uncotrelated 
with information at time t, and in particular with past realizations of 
the external target variable.  Under the alternative  hypothesis, lagged 
realizations of the external target variable-  -presumably  correlated with 
the right-hand side of equation (22)--are correlated with the term on 
left-hand side.  Intuitively, in the center country the deviations of 
the domestic target from its desired value are white-noise errors.37 
In order to derive testable implications, I need identifying 
assumptions about the unobservable term lt 
It is plausible to assume 
that it is uncorrelated with lagged values of the external target, thus 
allowing the domestic and the external targets to be more clearly 
isolated.  In this case, when a country's monetary authority targets a 
See Sargent and Wallace  [1976]  for derivations of similar tests in 
the context of linear-quadratic control models. 36 
domestic variable  exclusively, lagged  values of the external target 
should be uncorrelated with the domestic target.  These tests are 
apparently similar to those performed by Pippenger [1984] and Dutton 
[1984]  who analyzed central bank policies under the gold standard.  As 
I stress in Giovannini [1986] ,  however,  the interpretation of my test is 
dramatically different.  While I concentrate on the reducedform 
properties of the data,  implied by the alternative structures of the 
international monetary system, Pippenger and Dutton intend to estimate 
parameters of central banks' reaction functions.  These specifications, 
however  are not linked to an underlying optimization problem of central 
banks: hence the tests of the significance of individual parameters 
proposed by these authors are difficult to interpret. 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 report the results of some exploratory tests of 
the asymmetry hypothesis.  Table 3 contains the results for the gold 
standard data (monthly).  I assume that the domestic target variable for 
each central bank is an index of coverage of the central bank's 
liabilities:  the proportion of the gold reserve to total deposit 
liabilities in the Banking Department of the Bank of England, the 
proportion of cash to total demand liabilities in the Reichsbank,38 and 
the ratio of the gold reserve to circulation in the Bank of France.  In 
addition, I assume that the desired value of the target variable  is 
38 
Which equals the ratio of the sum of coin and Imperial treasury 
notes, divided by the sum of notes in circulation and other demand 
liabilities. 37 
constant  (plausibly determined by national regulations on coverage, and 
banking practice).  For all three countries, I test whether lagged 
values of net imports of gold are significantly correlated with the 
target variable  (in first difference), beyond a set of seasonal 
dummies.39  The table shows that the null hypothesis of no correlation 
is rejected at the 5 percent level in the case of Germany and France 
(the marginal significance level, the probability that the test 
statistic exceeds the reported value when the null hypothesis is true, 
is actually less than 1 percent in the case of Germany), but it is not 
rejected for England. 
Table 4 contains the results for the Bretton Woods data 
(quarterly).  The domestic target variable is assumed to be the domestic 
money-market interest rate,  while the foreign target  variable  is the 
change in foreign exchange reserves relative to high-powered money.4° 
As before, I include seasonal dummies in the regression. 
I find that past balance of payments flows are highly significantly 
correlated with the domestic money market rate in the United States and 
in the United Kingdom.  This correlation is insignificant in France and 
Since the theory does not predict that the disturbances should be 
i.i.d. under the null hypothesis, the test statistics are computed 
using the White  [1980]  correction for heteroskedasticity. 
40 
All the data is from International Financial Statistics.  Valiation 
effects on foreign exchange reserves are subtracted by subtracting 
the "other items" line from net foreign reserves at the central bank 38 
west Germany. 
Table 5 contains the results for the EMS data.  The specification 
of the  regression equations is identical to that for the Bretton Woods 
data,  The hypothesis that lagged values of foreign reserve flows are 
orthogonal to the domestic target (nominal interest rate) is rejected at 
the 1 percent level in the case of France of Italy, but not in the case 
of West Germany.  In summary, the test results agree with the 'center 
country  hypothesis in the  case of the gold standard and the  EMS,  but 
cot in the case of Bretton Woods. 
.  Concluding Observations 
The data seems to support the hypothesis of asymmetry  at least in 
the case of  the gold standard and the EMS.  Although the institutional 
setup in both regimes is clearly not inducing asymmetry, there are 
striking similarities in the use of capital controls.  Furthermore, the 
evidence on interest rate behavior and the statistical tests both 
support the asymmetric model, 
In the case of Bretton Woods, the statistical model rejects the 
asymmetry hypothesis, and the evidence on interest rates is--at least in 
some  cases--not as clearcut as in the case of the EMS. 
In this paper I have followed the strategy of trying to uncover 
evidence of asymmetry without exploiting the implications of specific 39 
models of asymmetric international monetary systems, like those 
mentioned in section 4.  None of the factors giving rise to asymmetries 
described above, in my opinion, can alone fully explain all three 
historical experiences studied in this paper.  I do believe, though, 
that further empirical work should help to identify which of the 
alternative models of an asymmetric international monetary system best 
fit the individual historical experiences. 40 
Table 1: 
Bilateral Fluctuation  Bands 
Currency  (x-rate)  Parity  Lower Limit  Upper Limit 
Gold Standard 
Sterling  ($/pound)  4.866  4.827  4890 
Franc  (FF/$)  5,183  5.148  5.215 
Mark  (DM/$)  4.198  4.168  4.218 
Bretron Woods 
Sterling  ($/pound)  2.8  2.772  2.828 
Franc  (FF/$)  4.937  4.887  4.986 
Mark  (DM/$)  4.2  4.158  4.242 
European Monetary System 
Franc  (FF/DM)  2.310  2.258  2.362 
Sources. Gold Standard: Morgenstern  [1959].  Sterling points  are computed for 
gold  trade from Britain to the US (in 1879).  Franc and mark  points  are computed 
for trade from Paris and Berlin  (respectively) to New  York (in 1901)  .  Bretron 
W4T:  International Financial Statistics.  Data  refers to  the year 1960.  4: 
European Economy.  Data refers to March 1979. 41 
Table  2: 
The Timing  of Discount  Rates  During  the Gold Standard 
Dependent  Variables: 
GB  GER  FRA 
0.434  0.956  0.982 
DW  2.000  2.000  2.001 
F-tests:  GB  0.000  0.432  0.780 
GER  0.000  0.000  0.038 
FRA  0.117  0.574  0.000 
Sample:  Weekly  froa  January  1890 to December  1907.  The entries  denoted  by F- 
test are the marginal  significance  levels  of the null  hypothesis  that the 
coefficients  of the lagged discount  rates of the country  of the corresponding 
row are not significant  in the regressions  with dependent  variable the country 
of the corresponding  colunmn. 42 
Table  3: 
Test  Results: Gold Standard 
Country: 
Britain  Germany  France 
Sample  1889:12 1907:12  1892:12 1907:12  1900:10 1907:12 
R2  0.480  0.915  0.515 
F-tests:  0.271  0.004  0029 
The entries denoted by F-test are the marginal significance  levels of the null 
hypothesis  that the coefficients of  the lagged net imports of gold are not 
significant.  The statistic  is computed using the White  [1980)  correction of the 
variance-covariance  matrix  of  disturbances. 43 
Table 4: 
Test Results:  Bretton Woods 
Country: 
US  UK  Germany  France 
Sample  62:2 71:4  64:2 71:4  62:2 71:4  62:2 71:4 
0.516  0.594  0.185  0.163 
F-tests:  0.000  0000  0.518  0.400 
The entries denoted by  F-test  are the marginal significance levels  of the null 
hypothesis  that the coefficients of the lagged ratio of  reserves flow  relative 
to high  powered  money  are not significant.  The statistic is computed using the 
White [1980J correction  of  the variance-covariance  matrix  of  disturbances. 44 
Table 5: 
Test Results: EMS 
Country: 
Germany  France  Italy 
Sample  80:3 88:1  80:3 88:1  80:3 87:4 
R2  0.079  0.345  0.350 
F-tests:  0.690  0.009  0.003 
The entries denoted by  F-test are the marginal significance  levels of  the nufl. 
hypothesis  that the coefficients of  the lagged  ratio  of reserves flow  relative 
to high  powered money  are not significant.  The statistic  is computed using the 
White  [l980 correction  of  the variance-covariance  matrix of disturbances. 45 
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